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PREFACE
IIASA has many reasons to be interested in the economics
of risks to human life: the potential costs of nuclear hazards,
the benefits of improved safety in industry, the possible pay-
offs of medical ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｡ ｲ ｣ ｾ Ｌ the pros and cons of a longevity that
is gradually increasing. This paper develops a consistent
method to evaluate change in mortality risk and loss or saving
of human life.
This analysis, developed in the System and Decision Sciences
Area, complements otner work done in the Energy Program's Joint
IIASA/IAEA Risk Project and in Management and Technology's Safe-
ty Standards Task.
The author would like to thank Neil Ericsson, Joanne
Linnerooth, 'and Nathan Keyfitz for valuable discussions on the
ideas of this paper.
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ABSTRACT
This study asks two questions:
(1) What is the net value to the representative individual over
his life-time of activities that alter age-specific mortality
risks?
(2) What is the cost to the representative individual of activ-
ities that take a life at random at a given age?
Results, derived from an ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｩ ｣ Ｍ ､ ｾ ｭ ｯ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｰ ｨ ｩ ｣ model with full
age-specific accounting have a strong actuarial flavor: altera-
tions in the mortality.schedule, caused say by a medical break-
through, should be assessed on the utility of expected additional
life-years, production, and reproduction, less expected social
costs of support. Loss of life at a specific age, due to an
accident say, should be assessed on the opportunity costs of ex-
pected lost years of living, lost production and reproduction,
less expected social support costs.
The results show that current methods, in general, leave out
an important social transfer term, that "value of a life lost" is
highly age-dependent, and that the degree of diminishing returns
to consumption is crucial in calculations of the economic cost
of risks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the more difficult questions the economist faces is
how to assess activities -- engineering projects, safety proce-
dures, medical advances -- that raise or lower risks to human
life. It is clear that in most situations proper safety should
be a matter of degree: engineering constructions should neither
be infinitely solid nor excessively flimsy. But how safe is
safe enough? What meaning can we give to phrases such as "the
value of life" or "the cost of hazards to life"? And what are
the economic consequences of the fact that mortality risks are
gradually falling -- that life is lenghtening?
Most writing on the evaluation of risks to life falls into
the large project evaluation literature. (For surveys see
Linnerooth (1975) and (1978}). This literature concerns itself
both with the social cost of projects that might increase risk
of death: siting of nuclear power stations, large dams, and
engineering constructions; and with the worth of activities that
might prolong life: design of safer highways, changes in air
safety regulations, and research to conquer cancer and heart
diseases. Whichever type of activity is examined -- prolonging
life or shortening it -- the arguments are symmetrical. Most of
this literature bypasses consideration of individual lives lost
or saved; instead it focuses on changes of overall risk of death
be they positive or negative.
Two points of view dominate this evaluation-of-mortality-
risk literature: the socalled "human-capital method", and the
"willingness-to-pay" approach. Let us look at them in turn.
The human capital approach, designed to measure social loss
due to increased accident or disease, has been proposed in various
forms by weisbrod (196l), Fromm (1962), Rottenberg (1967), Ridker
(1970), and others. The basic method sums earnings foregone by
individuals lost through death or incapicitation, and sets these
against the net economic benefits of the project. Whether these
earnings should be net of the individual1s consumption or not has
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been the subject of some contention. Because the method is
both conceptually simple and easily quantified, it is in wide-
spread use by engineers and government agencies.
As a measure of social loss from projects that put life
under risk, the human capital method is not without economic
appeal. What it measures is the loss in national product attri-
butable to mortality increase. Yet in recent years it has been
roundly criticized by economists: from a welfare theory viewpoint
it is founded on thin logic. As Schelling (1968) has argued, by
concentrating only on GNP -loss it ignores the individual's own
desire to live. Under the human capital approach, a medical
breakthrough that prolonged life from 70 to 80 years, for example,
would have no social justification-- it would not raise GNP.
The willingness-to-pay method, proposed by Mishan (1971),
does recognize the natural desire to ,live longer. Under this
method a scheme that increased life from 70 to 80 would be so-
cially justified if those who benefited were willing, in theory
at least, to pay more for their extra years than the cost of the
project. Wider social benefits, to close relatives for example,
would be included by assessing willingness to pay for increased
life of loved ones. This method; however, based on welfare
utilities and not on dollar earnings, has obvious difficulties
of quantification. Recently Conley (1973), Usher (1971) and
Jones-Lee (1974), have proposed separate methods to put the
criterion on a quantitative footing, by modeling the rational
person's willingness to buy extra years and valuing it in dollar
terms.
Both methods in current use, whether based on welfare
theory or not, suffer a major deficiency. They are fundamentally
partial-equilibrium approaches. They ignore the chain of wider
economic transfers set up through society when life is lengthened.
To return to the example, willingness-to-pay would approve an
advance in life from 70 to 80 years if those affected and their
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kin were willing to pay the cost of the increase. Forgotten
however, is that prolongation of life is not costless to wider
society: those who live longer, consume longer, and this extra
consumption must be financed by transfers from people at younger
productive ages. Proper accounting would include, therefore,
intergenerational transfer costs, felt in this case as a heavier
social security burden on the young.
Ideally, in evaluating an activity that tends to prolong life,
one would start with complete general-equilibrium knowledge of
the economy and assess net benefits to each individual by tracing
through the complex chain of social transfers resulting from the
activity. The project could then be judged on some standard
welfare basis, such as the compensated welfare criterion. In
practice of course such knowledge is not available; this study
instead constructs a model, which although stylized, does capture
the important social transfers.
This study asks two questions:
(1) What is the net value to the representative individual
over his life-time of activities that alter his life-
risk -- activities that change the shape of his mortality
age-schedule?
(2) What is the cost to the representative individual of
activities that take a life at random at a given age?
Results are summarized in formal expressions for the net
social worth of mortality variations and of age-specific lives
lost. They show that, first, under the chosen life-cycle criter-
ion, when risks are altered -- lowered say -- the utility value of
expected additional life-years, production, and reproduction
must be set against expected additional social support costs.
Second, when an activity causes loss of life, age-incidence is
all important: loss of life at age 30 is in general socially
much more costly than loss of life at age 80. Third, the results
show that (a) the willingness-to-pay criterion overstates the
value of prolonging life and (b) under certain restricted
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circumstances the popular, but maligned human-capital method is
in fact correct. Finally, if we are willing to put quantitative
bounds on the tradeoff between additional lifeyears versus ad-
ditional consumption, we can derive a numerical bracket in which
the cost of lives lost must fall.
2. THE ECONOMICS OF CHANGES IN MORTALITY RISK
To set the context for the analysis I first set up a neo-
classical, age-specific model of the economy and population.
Within this model, the effect of a change in the mortality pat-
tern on lifecycle wellbeing is then derived. Both population
and economy are assumed in steady state growth, individuals are
alike in tastes and behavior, and production shows constant
returns. Later, I shall discuss whether the results hold up
when these assumptions are relaxed.
Neoclassical Model
Begin with the economy. Output is produced by combining
capital K and labor L in a constant-returns production functionF.
The economy stores no consumption goods. Output is split into
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｾ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ and investment in capital growth. Thus
( 1 ) oF(K(t),L(t)) = C(t) + K(t) C(t) > 0 1
For the population we need a fair degree of age-specific
detail. The population grows according to the Lotka dynamics
(2)
w
B(t) = iB(t - x)p(t,x)m(t,x)dx
where B is births per unit time, p is the proportion who survive
to age x at time t, and m is the proportion reproducing at age x,
time t; w is an upper bound on the length of life and the initial
birth sequence is assumed given. This year's flow of births, in
other words, is produced by those who were born x years ago and
have survived to reproduce.
l)F is assumed concave, first-degree homogeneous and con-
tinuously differentiable; for simplicity capital depreciation
is ignored.
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Assume the population is stable,2 and is growing exponen-
tially at rate g. In this case equation (2) has the solution
(3) B(t) = B(O)egt
where the growth rate g is connected to mortality p and fertil-
ity m by substituting (3) in (2) and cancelling B to yield
(4)
w
1 = [e-gX p(x)m(x)dx
o ,
If ｾ Ｈ ｸ Ｉ is the age schedule of labor participation, labor
force L and total population N are given by
(5)
( 6 ) N(t) ｾ ｬ Ｚ Ｈ ｴ - x)p(x)dx ｾ B(tJl:-gXp(X)dX
o
The labor/population ratio L/N and the birth rate B/N will be
denoted by h(g) and b(g) respectively.
Individual consumption varies with age, as do the mortality,
fertility, and labor participation rates above. (How it varies
is determined below.) Putting population and economic variables
together, we can express total consumption C as the sum of in-
dividual age-related consumption c(t,x) by
( 7 ) CIt) ｾ 1:(t - x)p(x)c(t,x)dx
Later, we shall need three parameters: the average ages of
producing AL , consuming AC ' and reproducing AM' in the population,
defined by
2)That is, its age-specific rates of fertility and mor-
tality and its normalized age-distribution are all constant
over time; g is assumed. positive.
-6-
W ,(W
AL ｾＮﾣ x e -gx p (x) A (x) dx /.fa e -gx p (x) A (x) dx
W w
Am ｾ Ｎ ﾣ x e -gx p (x)m(x) dx /.£ e -gx p (x)m (x) dx
Assuming ｴ ｨ ｾ economy has reached a Solow-type steady state,
where the growth rate of the economy equals that of population
and per capita variables are constant, and assuming investment is
chosen to maximize total consumption, then
(8) oK/K = g i c(t,x) = c(x) and F = gK
One central fact in society is that consumption, which takes
place at all ages, must be supported by production, which takes
place only at labor-participative ages. The economy in other
words functions at all times under the budget identity
(9) C _ F(K,L) - gK
that is,
;:: (t-x) p (x) c (x) dx " (FIL - g K/L) Ｑ ｾ (t-x) p (x)). (x) dx •
o .
Using (3) and dividing through by B(t), with usual per-unit
labor notation this societal budget constraint becomes
(10) j w We -gx p (x) c (x) dx :: (f (k) -gk) Ie -gx p (x) \ (x) dx
o 0
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Thus intergenerational transfers are introduced by the inescap-
able requirement that, when growth, labor-participation rates,
and the capital-output ratio remain unchanged, any increase in
consumption for one age-group must be matched by decreases for
other age-groups.
To complete the model, it remains to determine the lifecycle
pattern of consumption. It is assumed that people individually
allocate their consumption to maximize their expected lifetime
welfare W, where
( 11 ) W = ｛ｾ｛ c (x) , x] p (x) dx
o
In aggregate, of course, they must do this in such a way that
ｴ ｨ ｾ societal budget constraint continues to hold at all times.
The standard consumption-loan mechanism arranges this (Samuelson
(1958) ): a market interest rate appears which encourages people
to distribute their consumption over their -lifecycle in such a
way that the social budget constraint is always met. The exact
mechanisms of this need not concern us; it is sufficient to say
that the individual spreads his consumption so that lifecycle
welfare is maximized subject to (10) being met. Finding the
lifecycle consumption pattern is thus a simple constrained
variational problem, the solution of which yields
(12) dU/dC(X) = dU/dc(O)e-gx
Thus lifecycle consumption is patterned according to age-related
need so that its marginal usefulness is the same at all ages,
modified only by the ability to invest at an interest rage g,
which equals the rate of population growth. Condition (12)
therefore is the continuous-age generalization of Samuelson's
"biological interest rate" condition.
All preliminaries are now completed. Population and ･ ｣ ｯ ｾ
nomic growth are well-defined «3), (4) and (8)), as is the
pattern of lifecycle consumption (12). And the social budget
identity (10) connects the demography of consumption with that
of production.
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Change in Age-Specific Risks
We now introduce a particular, but small, age-specific
change in age-specific risks, so that the mortality schedule
p(x) becomes p(x) + op(x), and derive the implications for our
chosen criterion--the representative person's lifetime utility,W. l
Survival
Probability
ｬ ｲ Ｍ Ｍ ｾ ］ ］ ］ ］ ｾ ｟
0l-- ----'O'- t-__ ｾ "O::"' _
Figure 1.
x Age
Figure 1 illustrates op(x) for a decrease in the incidence of
cancer (scale of op(x) exaggerated slightly). For convenience,
I shall assume in this section that the mortality variation
lengthens life; for shortened life the argument is symmetrical.
When the mortality schedule changes, several variables are
forced to change with it: the growth rate g, the consumption
1) A word on the choice of expected lifetime utility as the
social criterion. It is quite legitimate to ask what are the
consequences of risk-change for any arbitrary criterion. Suit-
ability of a particular criterion depends on how well it "repre-
sents" social interests and on the "reasonableness" of the im-
plications, both judgmental matters. Assuming risk-neutral
individuals with identical tastes who fulfill the von Neurnann-
Morgenstern choice axioms, W is arguably representative. Reason-
ableness of implications will be judged later.
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pattern c(x), lifecycle utility W, and others. I shall write
Og[op(x)] as the differential change l in growth due to the partic-
ular age-specific mortality variation op(x). Where the variation
op(x) is understood, I shall simply write og. Similar practice
will be followed with other variables.
/
At this point some new notation will be useful. Let
U = Ｎﾣｾ [c (x) •xl op (x) dxex
cex =
[:-gX c(x)op(x)dx
(13 ) L = l:-gX A (x)op(x)dxex
v = £:-gx m(xl op (xl dxex
The first three can be viewed as the expectations of extra util-
ity from lengthened life, of extra lifetime consumption, and of
extra man-years of production resulting from the particular
variation op(x). The fourth, v , is the change in reproductive
ex
value -- loosely speaking expected additional children per person
due to the mortality variation. (The last three are discounted
because future consumption utilities are later valued to date
of birth.)
To derive og[op(x)], the change in the intrinsic growth
rate due to the mortality variation, recall equation (4):
1 ｾ l:-gXm(X)P(X)dX
1) Technically og [op (x)] is a Frechet differential -- a ､ｩｦｾ
ferential whose argument is a function and not a single valued
variable.
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Using the appropriate chain rule
whence
( 1 4 )
;::-gxm (x) op (x) dx
ag[ap(x)] =l w x ･ｾｧｸ m (x) p (x) dx =
The altered mortality pattern affects the growth rate by the
change in reproductive value divided by the average age of
motherhood (average length between generations). Note that if
the mortality variation affects only post-reproductive ages,
vex is zero, so that no change in the growth rate occurs.
We can now derive the change in expected lifetime welfare,
oW [ap (x) ]. From (11)
oW ｾ fa ｾ｛ｃ (x) ,x] op (x) dx +;::u/ac (x) oc (x) p (x) dx
( 1 5)
ｾ ｬ ｾ ｛ ｃ (x) ,x]Op (x) dx + au/ac (0) r: -gx oc (x) p (x) dx
o J'o
Lifecycle welfare is changed directly by extra years and in-
directly by the alteration in consumption pattern needed to ac-
commodate these extra years. The latter can be evaluated by
taking differentials across the societal budget identity (10).
This yields, on collecting terms,
[
w iW ,rfJJ .
o = 0 e-gx c (x) a p (x) dx + 0 e -gx ac (x) p(x) dx - (f (k) -gk)J
o
e -gx A(X) apex) dx
(16 )
+ ok (f'-g)[:-gx A(x)p(x)iJx - So 9
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where
B ｾ l xWe -<JX c(x)p(x)dx - (f(k) Ｍ ｧ ｫ Ｉ ｬ ｾ ･ -<JX A(x)p(x)dx - ie"!..gx A(x)p(x)dx
From the savings rule f' = g the fourth term in (16) disappears.
Where c is per capita consumption, S, the lifecycle value of a
marginal increase in the growth rate, can be expressed as
Finally, using (16) to substitute for the second term in
(15), and noting that for constant returns f - gk is FL , we obtain
Reexpressed in more convenient notation this becomes our first
main result. The net lifecycle utility value of an age-specific
change in mortality risk is given by
( 18) OW U
ex +
au {F .L + vexB/l\n }= ac(O) cexL ex
Lifecycle Utility of Value of Social cost Value of
welfare extra life- + extra labor of consump- + additional
increase years years tion upkeep children
The net individual lifecycle welfare increase thus consists of
four components. When mortality is improved, the individual is
blessed with extra years of life, extra years of productive work
if pre-retirement years are affected, and extra children if re-
productive years are affected. On the other hand extra years
must somehow be supported. The third term shows the total amount
of consumption support needed -- a burden on social security, or
a burden on private savings earlier in life, or a burden on one's
children, depending on the particular social arrangement that
ensures support for the elderly.
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These welfare changes occur at different periods in the
lifecycle. Those at younger age-groups carry the consumption
cost; only in later life do they reap the utility of extra years,
the costs now turned over to a new generation. To the extent
that population is growing, younger age-groups are larger than
older ones and transfers toward later ages are easier on the
individual; this is why the analysis discounts costs at rate g
over the lifecycle in the above terms.
3. DISCUSSION
Any risk evaluation method must unavoidably compare two
very different things: the enjoyment of additional living (U
ex
in (18)), and the enjoyment of additional consumption (the terms
within the bracket). It would be of great advantage to express
all terms in consistent units. Assume that U is the same at all
ages, with constant elasticity of consumption E, given in the
usual way by
dU c
E = ---dc U(c)
It can then be shown that (18) reduces to
(19)
where w(=FL) is the wage rate. Utility of additional years now
becomes Cex/E when translated into consumption terms. When E =
0.5 for example, additional years are valued at twice the consump-
tion needed to support them. Taking the terms within the bracket
in (19), the mortality pattern change is worth to the individual
marginal consumption equivalent to
(20)
Example 3.1. To illustrate (20), let us assess the worth
to the individual of elimination of cardiovascular diseases in
the U.S. Using the cause-deleted lifetables of Preston, Keyfitz,
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and Schoen (1972), Table 1 in the Appendix shows the age-specific
mortality variation that would result. Under 1975 U.S. data
(again see Appendix) and definitions (13), complete elimination
of cardiovascular diseases yields the differentials
Extra Years
10.33 56,870 0.6918 .00135
Cardiovascular diseases attack for the most part post-productive
and -reproductive ages. Hence, though longevity increases con-
ｳ ｩ ､ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｢ ｬ ｹ Ｌ expected working-life and expected number of children
increase only a little.
Where s = 1.0, 0.6, and 0.3
(1.0 - 1) 56,870
C.E. = (1.667 1) 56,870 + (13,749) 0.692 + (-68,125) 0.00135 =
(3.333 - 1) 56,870
$ 9,400
$ 47,300
$142,100
This of course does not imply the U.S. should spend corresponding
amounts per person on cardiovascular elimination. A flood of
research dollars would by no means guarantee such a breakthrough.
The illustration however gives an idea of the potential returns
to the individual.
The example shows the crucial, but arbitrary element in the
evaluation of mortality change is the degree of diminishing re-
turns to consumption -- the degree to which pure enjoyment of
additional years is offset by its consumption cost. In our well-
off society we could expect additions to longevity to outweigh
consumption considerations (s is low), but in poorer societies
(s is high) utility of additional living might be offset by the
additional burden of support; in certain nomadic tribes for
example, older members, if no longer productive; are expected to
separate themselves and die. l
l)Even in Western society, life could not be extended much
beyond 100 years unless retirement age were also increased. See
Boulding (1965) for an entertaining essay on the economic menace
of extreme longevity.
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One often hears two different ethical arguments where
activities that put life at risk are under discussion: "life is
infinitely valuable" versus "social product is what counts". In
our schema these follow from different positions on returns to
consumption. When £ tends to zero, (20) shows that additional
life-years outweigh any consumption considerations: activities
should be judged only on whether they preserve and prolong life.
When £ is one, "utility is consumption", and extensions to life
are perfectly offset by their consumption cost: only social
product considerations remain. Normally, where returns to con-
sumption are in the usual range, £ between zero and one, (20)
retains elements of both ethical positions.
We can use (20) to comment on the two methods in present
use. Willingness-to-pay, as presently used, ignores the negative
social burden term. In the usual case where the reproductive
term is negligible it will therefore overstate the value of
mortality reduction and unduly bias against risky projects.
Human capital fares slightly better. In the special case where
(a) altered risks do not affect childbearing ages, (b) population
growth is vanishingly small, and (c) utility shows constant re-
turns to consumption (£ = 1), additional life-years would be ex-
actly offset by their consumption cost, so that (20) would reduce
to
C. E. = w • Lex
In this case, and this case only, the (gross) human capital
method would be justifiable and correct.
Extensions. Two extensions of the analysis of the previous
section are worth looking at. First, where life of loved ones
is valued, person its utility rate u i might include the extra
enjoyment a i that loved ones j (with age differences a j ) are
alive:
.* i \' iU1. = U + La. p (x + a. )j J J
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whence lifecycle welfare becomes for person i
Wi = ｛ＨｾｩｰＨｘＩ､ｘ + I ｛ＺｾｰＨｸＫ｡ＬＩｰＨｘＩ､ｘｊJo j 0 ) )
Under this criterion the social value expression (18) would con-
tain an extra kith-and-kin term:
. [CllIa: (op(x+a.)p(x) + p(x+a.)op(x))dxj ) 0 ) )
Lessened mortality risk, in other words, is twice valuable -- it
increases both the chances parents and grandparents will survive
to be enjoyed, and that we will survive to enjoy our children
and grandchildren.
Second, a change in length of life may be accompanied by a
change in the age of retirement or in the age-specific labor
participation schedule. For this case the Lex term should then
reflect extra labor years due to increased participation, as
well as increased survival.
Robustness. How robust is the analysis of Section 2 when
the assumptions of the model are replaced by more realistic ones?
Recall that we assumed economic and demographic steady-state
growth, constant returns in production, perfect life-cycle fi-
nancial markets, and similar individuals who face similar mor-
tality schedules.
Note first that the most important factors are scarcely
changed under increased realism. When risks to life fall for
the population (a) the individual does enjoy extra years, extra
working life, and perhaps extra reproduction, and (b) whatever
the ｳ ｵ ｰ ｰ ｯ ｾ ｴ mechanism for old age, be it gifts to tribal elders,
Robinson Crusoe stockpiling, or a government social-security
system, consumption must still be set aside for lengthened life
(although the amount may now depend on the transfer mechanism).
With non-constant returns in production and imperfect lifecycle
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markets, the valuation of these factors would change however.
The marginal value of consumption may well vary more widely than
in (12), labor would not necessarily be paid its marginal product,
and the value ｯ ｾ growth, S, would be altered. With non-optimal
investment, an extra capital-labor ratio adjustment term would
enter. These changes are relatively minor. More important is
the case where altered mortality risks strike the population
unevenly, or the mortality change comes suddenly, or demographic
and economic growth varies widely from steady-state. In this
case, some people may reap the benefits of increased life and
production, while others bear the consumption costs. For ex-
ample, a sudden mortality improvement can be a windfall to the
elderly -- they enjoy extra years while escaping the corresponding
extra support of the generation that went before.
4. VALUE OF LIFE
until now I have viewed activities that put life under
hazard in rather inconvenient terms as causing variations in the
mortality age-profile. Is it possible to proceed more directly
and value actual lives lost or saved? In the literature, most
writers prefer to deal with marginal changes in risk rather than
with direct loss of life, feeling possibly that increase of risk
is more approachable somehow, less awesome, than loss of life.
From an actuarial viewpoint, however, risk and death cannot be
separated. For any sizable population, an increase in age-
specific risk means, in lifetable terms, an increase in numbers
of deaths at specific ages. We might therefore expect valuation
of risk and valuation of lives lost to be closely connected.
Let us ask a specific question. Suppose in the community
an unspecified activity were to take on average one life at
random per year, at age a, how much consumption would the com-
munity as a whole be prepared to give up to rid itself of the
increased risk? The result will be called the Social Consumption
Equivalent (S.C.E.) of Life, at age a.
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To answer this question go back to the lifetable -- to how
p(x) is constructed. A lifetable is calculated by taking a base
number of births, B, (usually 10,000) and observing the year-by-
year decrements in survivorship. Assume that every B people
born undergo one additional death at age a. Until age a there
is no difference in survivorship; at age a there are B p(a) - 1
survivors instead of Bp(a) ; at age x> a there are (Bp(a) - 1) ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
survivors instead of Bp(x) . The additional death causes a
variation in the mortality schedule equal to the difference in
numbers surviving divided by the base:
op (x) =
o
p(x)/p(a)B
o < x < a
a < x < w
I shall write p(x)/p(a) as p(x\a), the probability of survival to
age x given survival already to age a. For each representative
person, from (20), expected lifecycle welfare is lowered in con-
sumption terms an amount
C.E. ｾ (t -l{:-gxc(x) P ｾｾｾｪＩ dx + wl:-gx M.x) P ｾｾｬｩＩ dx + ｾ fJ-gxm (x) ｅ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｩ Ｉ dx •
(21 )
In the spirit of project evaluation, we may sum this amount over
the individuals affected -- hence multiply by B -- to arrive at the
social consumption equivalent, S.C.E., that would compensate for
increased risk corresponding to loss of one life at age a. This
yields our second main result -- a result that has an obvious
actuarial interpretation
S.C.E. (a) ｾ (t ＭｬＩｬｾＧＮＮｧｸｃＨｘＩｐＨｘＧ a)dx +w£e';x). (x)p(xl a)dx + ｾｊＺＧＺＡＮＧＱｘｭＨｸＩｰＨｸｬ a)dx
(22)
Consumption
Equivalent of
Life, Age a
Value of Remaining +
Consumption years
at Age a
Value of Remaining + Value of Remaining
Earning years Reproduction
at Age a at Age a
Where consumption is roughly constant at level c(a) over the re-
maining years, this can be written as
(23)
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S . C . E. (a) = c (a) (f -1) e a + w. e £, a + 1
m
e
ma
where ex' e£,x, e
rnx
are the (discounted) expected values of re-
maining survival-years, labor-years, and net fertility at age x.
A marginal life lost, in other words, is valued in terms of
opportunity lost -- opportunity to enjoy further life, to produce
further output, to have additional children, less of course,
consumption support costs no longer necessary.
To give an idea of magnitudes, Table 4.1 illustrates ex'
e£,x' e
rnx
and the S.C.E. for u.s. 1975 data (see Appendix), under
d ' , 1lfferent returns to consumptlon.
Age 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
e 70.3 62.5 52.9 43.5 34.3 25.6 18.0 11. 7 6.7
x
e£,x 31.6 32.5 31.4 24.7 17.6 10.8 4.4 0.3 -
e 0.921 0.949 0.882 0.339 0.038 - - - -mx
e:=1.0 371 382 371 316 239 148 61 4 -
seE e:=0.6 668 664 619 520 399 265 139 54 31
HmO
-
e:=0.3 1,412 1,371 1,240 1,027 796 557 336 179 110
Table 4.1
Thus far we have assessed the cost of a single life lost at
a given age. How might we extend the analysis to numbers of
lives lost at various ages? Consider an activity R (airline
accidents say) that costs D e gt lives in year t, numbers of
deaths small relative to total deaths and growing at the same
l)S.C.E. at age 0 would not be a suitable way to measure
the desirability of introducing an additional birth: the analysis
calculates how much those aZready born would give up to avoid
certain types of risk. Also, this being steady-state analysis,
it assumes all cohorts face the same experience; for reasons
given in the robustness subsection, (22) would not be perfectly
correct as a valuation of a life lost on a once-only basis. Note
that the SCE figures in this illustration contains no cost of
loss to relatives or friends.
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rate as the population. Assume these deaths are distributed as
d(a)egt at age a, so that the probability that a life lost to
this activity is aged a is ｾ ｒ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ = d(a)/D. In our analysis cost
of lives lost is imputed to this year's cohort which stands to
lose d(a)eg(t+a) lives at age a in year t + a. The cost-of-life
argument above is additive over lives lost, therefore for this
activity in year-t, total (consumption-equivalent) losses are
=Total S.C.E. I d (a) e gt • ega • s. C. E. (a)
a
Finally, multiplying above and below by D, gives the needed result
(24) Total S.C.E. = D e gt • I ｾｒＨ｡ＩＮ ega. S.C.E. (a)
a
1
Cost of lives lost, in other words, is the number of deaths
times the expected cost of a death in the activity in question.
Example 4.1. In the U.S., introduction of the 55 m.p.h.
speed limit shows clearly in the motor-vehicle death statistics
as saving roughly 9000 lives per year. 2 What is the social gain?
Assuming lives are saved in the same proportions as road acci-
dents normally strike the population, the probability distribu-
tion of a life saved is:
Age o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
ｾ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ .027 .045 .224 .152 .119 .117 .119 .116 .081
Expected social cost of a single motor vehicle death is then
I ¢R(a) ega S.C.E. (a)
a
$763,000
= $369,000
$212,000
E: = 0.3
E: = 0.6
E: = 1.0
l)The ega factor enters to preserve consistency: the cost-
of-life argument was developed on a cohort (lifecycle) basis
whereas deaths are introduced on a period (current year) basis.
2)Total motor-vehicle deaths are given in the U.S. 1977
Statistical Abstract as 54.6, 54.7, 56.3, 55.5, 46.4, 46.0, 47.1
(thousand) from 1970-1976. Nathan Keyfitz called my attention
to these figures. Preston et ala (1972), for U.S. 1964, was used
as source for ｾ Ｈ ｡ Ｉ Ｎ
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From (24), 9000 deaths averted are worth $6.9, $3.3, or
$1.9 billion per year in. consumption terms, depending on whether
£ = 0.3, 0.6, or 1.0.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper derived expressions for the value of activities
that alter the mortality schedule and for the cost of premature
loss of life, under specific assumptions and a life-cycle crite-
rion. Full age-specific accounting, where labor participation,
consumption, fertility, mortality, and utility are dependent on
age, brings an actuarial precision to the results: alterations
in the mortality schedule should be assessed by the difference
they make to expected length of life, production, reproduction
and consumption support; loss of life should be assessed by the
expected opportunity costs of lost years, production and repro-
duction, less support costs.
It should be emphasized that these results depend highly on
our choice of life-cycle criterion. A life lost at age 80 has
less opportunity to contribute to this criterion than one lost
at age 30, hence the implied "value of life" decreases with age.
This sits comfortably, for the most part, with our intuitive
feelings; if we felt on the other hand that "a life is a life
whatever the age" our criterion would be no longer appropriate.
The degree of returns to consumption figures large in the
economics of mortality risk. While individual terms in an evalu-
ation can be assessed quite accurately, overall valuation of
mortality change requires comparison between increased longevity /
and its consumption cost: it requires taking a stance on returns
to consumption. One possible way to deal with this is to set
reasonable bounds for returns to consumption; the value of mor-
tality change can then be bracketed quite accurately.
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6. APPENDIX
The illustrations use u.s. data chosen to correspond to
year 1975. a
For the cardiovascular example, the following survival
schedules are used: b p(x) is the usual survival table; PE(x)
would obtain if cardiovascular diseases were eliminated; op(x),
the variation caused by eliminating these diseases, is the
difference.
Age 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
PE(x) 1.000 97029 96402 95260 93747 .91056 .85807 76547 .62615
P (x) 1.000 .97000 .96343 .95091 93149 .88841 .79228 .61135 .34853
op (x) 0.000 .00029 .00059 .00169 .00598 .02215 .06579 .15412 .27762
Table 1
Labor participation and fertility schedules are:
Age -16 16-19 20-24 25-29 30-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
A(X)C .549 .751 .755 .744 .738 .704 .646 .479 .131
Age 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
d
.0006 .0290 .0595 .0566 .0272 .0101 .0024 .0001m(x)
a)All data are for male and female combined.
b)From latest available cause-of-death lifetables: Preston
et ale (1972), for u.s. 1964. The 1964 survival probabilities
are used throughout the illustrations; mortality in the u.s. has
changed but little in the last 15 years. For conciseness, only
10 year intervals are shown above; all calculations however were
based on 5-year intervals. Preston (1976) contains further details
on cause of death.
c)source: ILO Year Book 1976; data for u.s. 1975.
d) Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1977; data for
u.s. 1974.
Other data:
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L = 94,793,000 c
c=$6,142 e
N = 213,137,000 d
K = $4,303 billion e
In the absence of a usable consumption age-schedule, it is
assumed that those 15 and under consume one-half of an adult's
standard consumption; those 65 and above, three quarters. This
-yields for consistency with average consumption c
Age
c(x)
0-15
3582
15-65
7164
65+
5373
Computations on the above data, smoothed where necessary,
yield
g = 0.00; b = 0.148; Ac = 38.07; AL ,= 38.92; Am = 25.21
o $1 716 . 11' f OJｾ = -, ml lon; ｾ Am = -$68,125; - gw - $13,749 .
e)1977 u.s. Stat.Abst.; data for 1975 in current dollars.
In the consumption figure, government expenditures were taken
as part of consumption. K represents total reproducible assets.
f)For discussion on S, the value of a marginal increase in
g, and why it is negative, see Arthur and McNicoll (1978).
g) For consistency with the lifecycle model here (g = 0), w,
the wage rate was computed from (12): fc(x)p(x)dx == wjA(x)p(x)dx.
-23-
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